Taiwan's New Party vows to help improve relations

A high-level delegation from Taiwan’s New Party, led by its chairman Yok Mu-ming, concluded a significant visit to Beijing on Monday, reaffirming their steadfast support for the one-China principle and their firm opposition to any forms of "Taiwan independence." The visit, which included meetings with top political adviser Yu Zhengsheng and Zhang Zhijun, head of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, underscored Beijing’s consistent policy toward the self-governing island and its intent to engage political forces in Taiwan that align with its vision for cross-Straits relations, particularly amidst a freeze in official communications with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration.

Background: The Bedrock of Cross-Straits Relations – The 1992 Consensus

The bedrock of stable cross-Straits relations, as consistently articulated by Beijing, is the 1992 Consensus. This understanding, reached between semi-official representatives from both sides, acknowledges that "both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China." While each side holds differing interpretations of what "one China" precisely entails, the core agreement has served as a crucial political foundation for dialogue and cooperation for decades. The New Party, since its inception, has been a vocal proponent and defender of this consensus, setting it apart from other political entities in Taiwan, most notably the ruling DPP.

The 1992 Consensus gained prominence during the presidency of Lee Teng-hui in Taiwan, emerging from a series of cross-Straits talks. Its formulation provided a pragmatic framework, allowing for engagement while sidestepping more contentious sovereignty issues. For years, it facilitated a period of relative stability and growing economic ties. However, with the rise of the DPP and its more independence-leaning platform, particularly since the 2000s and more acutely following Tsai Ing-wen’s presidency beginning in 2016, the consensus has come under strain. The DPP government has refused to explicitly acknowledge the 1992 Consensus, leading Beijing to suspend official dialogue channels, including those between the Taiwan Affairs Office and Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council. This current impasse makes visits like that of the New Party delegation particularly noteworthy, as they represent an alternative avenue for communication and the reiteration of Beijing’s core principles.

The New Party’s Enduring Stance and Its Significance

During their meeting, Yu Zhengsheng, then chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), highly commended the New Party for its "unbroken stance" in upholding the 1992 Consensus and the one-China principle. Yu praised the party’s consistent commitment to peaceful development of cross-Straits relations, a stance that has remained resolute since the party’s establishment. Chairman Yok Mu-ming reciprocated, affirming the New Party’s unwavering dedication to these principles and its active role in promoting cross-Straits peace and exchanges.

The New Party, founded in 1993 by a faction that split from the Kuomintang (KMT), has historically advocated for the eventual reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. While its electoral influence in Taiwan has diminished over time compared to the KMT or DPP, its ideological clarity on cross-Straits issues positions it as a significant voice for a segment of the Taiwanese population that identifies strongly with Chinese culture and supports a closer relationship with the mainland. Their visit to Beijing at this juncture serves multiple purposes: it allows Beijing to reinforce its message through a sympathetic Taiwanese voice, provides the New Party an international platform, and signals to the broader Taiwanese electorate that avenues for engagement exist outside of the current ruling party.

Beijing’s Policy Framework: Insights from the 19th CPC National Congress

Yu Zhengsheng’s remarks were deeply rooted in the guidelines and policies addressing Taiwan that were clarified during the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) held in October. This landmark congress, which solidified President Xi Jinping’s leadership and vision, presented a comprehensive framework for China’s future development, including its approach to Taiwan.

In his extensive opening address to the congress, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC, unequivocally declared the one-China principle as the "political foundation" of cross-Straits relations. He issued a stern warning against any attempts to move toward "Taiwan independence" in any form, asserting that such endeavors "will be defeated." This statement reiterated Beijing’s unwavering determination to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity, signalling that while peaceful reunification is the preferred path, all options remain on the table should separatist forces push for independence.

Beyond the firm stance against independence, Xi’s address also extended an olive branch, emphasizing the immense development opportunities available to Taiwan on the Chinese mainland. He articulated a vision where Taiwan residents would enjoy "the same treatment as mainland people" across various aspects of life – whether pursuing studies, starting businesses, seeking employment, or residing on the mainland. This policy aims to foster deeper integration and shared prosperity, encouraging people-to-people exchanges and demonstrating the tangible benefits of closer ties. This dual approach – firm opposition to independence coupled with incentives for integration – is a hallmark of Beijing’s Taiwan policy. The "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," a core theme of Xi’s leadership, inherently includes the resolution of the Taiwan question, framing it as a crucial step towards restoring China’s historical glory and power.

Detailed Engagements: Meetings with the Taiwan Affairs Office

In addition to the high-profile meeting with Yu Zhengsheng, the New Party delegation also engaged with Zhang Zhijun, head of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). This meeting was particularly significant as the TAO is the primary government body responsible for managing cross-Straits affairs. The discussions between Zhang and Yok Mu-ming built upon the themes of the earlier meeting, focusing on practical steps and mutual commitments.

Both Zhang and Yok unequivocally agreed on the imperative to uphold the one-China principle moving forward. They expressed "firm opposition to separatist activities" and pledged to redouble efforts toward fostering peaceful relations across the Strait. Crucially, the two sides agreed to establish and improve mechanisms for communication, acknowledging the importance of sustained dialogue, even if unofficial, to manage the complexities of the relationship. This commitment included sharing opinions on major issues in the relationship and promoting exchanges and communication in all fields, with a particular emphasis on youth exchanges. Recognizing the importance of the younger generation in shaping future cross-Straits ties, they further agreed to create a "constructive and convenient environment" for the development of Taiwan youth on the mainland, aligning with Xi Jinping’s earlier promises.

These agreements highlight Beijing’s strategy to cultivate goodwill and engagement at the societal level, particularly among Taiwan’s youth, who are often perceived as less inclined towards reunification. By offering opportunities and facilitating their integration into mainland society, Beijing hopes to build long-term support for its vision of cross-Straits development.

Challenges and Threats: Beijing’s Critique of the DPP and Separatist Forces

During his meeting with the New Party delegation, Zhang Zhijun did not shy away from directly addressing the challenges facing cross-Straits relations, placing significant blame on Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Zhang stated that cross-Straits relations have faced considerable hurdles because the DPP has "refused to clearly express support for the one-China principle," a stance that led directly to the mainland’s suspension of official communications with the island. This reiterates Beijing’s consistent position that the acceptance of the 1992 Consensus is a non-negotiable prerequisite for official dialogue.

Zhang further elaborated on the activities of "Taiwan independence" forces, which he described as having "recently stirred up the island." He specifically cited proposals for the removal of "Chinese mainland elements" in a variety of fields, a process often referred to as "de-Sinicization." Zhang warned that the aim of such actions is to "cut the historical ties between Taiwan and the mainland, reduce public awareness that Taiwan people are part of the Chinese nation, and limit many cultural influences on the island." This reflects Beijing’s deep concern that these efforts are systematically eroding the shared cultural and historical identity that underpins its claim to Taiwan.

The TAO head also pointed to more direct political maneuvers by independence advocates, noting that "some people advocating ‘Taiwan independence’ have pushed for amending the law, and have proposed changing the island’s constitution." This, he argued, "shows that separatist activities and the group supporting ‘independence’ pose the most serious threat to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations." Zhang concluded with a stark warning, urging people from both sides of the Strait to "be vigilant and firmly oppose such activities," underscoring Beijing’s view of the existential threat posed by these independence-leaning movements.

A Brief Timeline of Cross-Straits Relations

1949: The Chinese Civil War ends with the Communist Party of China (CPC) establishing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland, and the Kuomintang (KMT) government retreating to Taiwan, establishing the Republic of China (ROC).
1979: The PRC issues a "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," proposing peaceful reunification and direct links.
1987: Taiwan lifts martial law and allows residents to visit relatives on the mainland, initiating cross-Straits exchanges.
1992: Representatives from both sides reach the "1992 Consensus," acknowledging "one China" with differing interpretations.
1993: The first high-level cross-Straits talks (Wang-Koo talks) take place in Singapore.
2000: Chen Shui-bian of the DPP wins Taiwan’s presidency, initiating an eight-year period of strained cross-Straits relations due to his party’s independence platform.
2008: Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT wins the presidency, ushering in a period of closer economic and cultural ties based on the 1992 Consensus.
2015: Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou hold a historic meeting in Singapore, the first between leaders of both sides since 1949.
2016: Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP wins the presidency. Her refusal to explicitly endorse the 1992 Consensus leads to a freeze in official cross-Straits communications.
Current Visit (2017): The New Party delegation’s visit to Beijing amidst the official freeze highlights Beijing’s strategy of engaging non-DPP political forces.

Broader Impact and Implications

The visit of the New Party delegation to Beijing, while not yielding immediate breakthroughs in official cross-Straits dialogue, carries significant implications across several dimensions.

For Beijing: The visit allows the PRC to publicly reaffirm its core policy objectives – the one-China principle, opposition to "Taiwan independence," and the promotion of peaceful development and eventual reunification – through a direct engagement with a Taiwanese political party. It demonstrates Beijing’s consistent approach, regardless of the ruling party in Taiwan. By engaging the New Party, Beijing signals its willingness to work with any Taiwanese political force that shares its fundamental view on the island’s status. This strategy also serves to bypass the uncooperative DPP government, maintaining a channel for communication and influence directly with a segment of the Taiwanese political landscape. Furthermore, the emphasis on youth exchanges and shared development opportunities on the mainland reflects Beijing’s long-term strategy of fostering deeper integration and cultivating pro-unification sentiment among future generations in Taiwan.

For the New Party: The delegation’s visit elevates the New Party’s profile both domestically in Taiwan and internationally. It reinforces their political platform as the staunchest defenders of the one-China principle and proponents of cross-Straits peace and eventual reunification. In a political environment where their electoral success has been limited, such high-level engagements provide them with a platform and demonstrate their relevance as interlocutors with Beijing. They position themselves as a potential bridge for communication during periods of official stalemate, which could resonate with some Taiwanese who are concerned about the current cross-Straits tensions and desire stability.

For Cross-Straits Relations: The visit starkly highlights the ongoing political deadlock. While calls for peace and engagement were central, the underlying tensions stemming from the DPP’s stance on the 1992 Consensus remain unresolved. The differing approaches to engagement – Beijing’s preference for official dialogue based on the 1992 Consensus versus its willingness to engage opposition parties – underscore the complexity of the relationship. The TAO’s explicit criticism of the DPP and "Taiwan independence" forces indicates that Beijing intends to maintain pressure on the Tsai administration, while simultaneously working to counter what it perceives as dangerous separatist trends within Taiwan society. The continued emphasis on military readiness (though not explicitly mentioned in this article, it is an underlying aspect of Beijing’s Taiwan policy) serves as a deterrent against any moves towards formal independence.

For Taiwan: The visit underscores the deep internal political divisions within Taiwan regarding its future and its relationship with mainland China. While the New Party represents a minority view, its engagement with Beijing is a reminder that a segment of Taiwanese society identifies with Chinese nationhood and supports closer ties. This creates pressure on the DPP government, which must navigate domestic political sentiment, international relations (particularly with the US), and Beijing’s consistent demands. The "de-Sinicization" efforts, as highlighted by Zhang Zhijun, are a contentious issue within Taiwan, reflecting a broader debate about Taiwanese identity, culture, and history.

In conclusion, the New Party’s visit to Beijing served as a robust reaffirmation of the one-China principle and a platform for Beijing to articulate its comprehensive Taiwan policy. While offering incentives for shared development and integration, Beijing also delivered a firm warning against "Taiwan independence" forces, emphasizing the serious threat they pose to regional peace and stability. The ongoing dialogue, even if unofficial, underscores the persistent complexity and sensitivity of cross-Straits relations, a critical issue for regional stability and the future of both sides.