Laily UPN
In a significant diplomatic engagement, the director of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), Zhang Zhijun, convened with a delegation from Taiwan’s New Party on Monday, underscoring Beijing’s persistent efforts to foster the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. The meeting, which took place shortly after the pivotal 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), served as a platform for Beijing to reiterate its policy framework regarding Taiwan, particularly in the context of strained official communications.
The New Party delegation, led by its chairman Yok Mu-ming, embarked on an eight-day visit to the mainland, concluding on Saturday. This "innovative trip," as described by Yok, aimed to bridge understanding and promote dialogue amidst a period characterized by a freeze in official cross-Strait exchanges. The timing and nature of the visit highlight Beijing’s strategy of engaging with pro-unification political parties and civil society groups from Taiwan, particularly when direct government-to-government channels remain suspended.
Mainland’s Stance and the Enduring Principle
During the meeting, Zhang Zhijun commended the New Party for its consistent advocacy for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and, crucially, its explicit recognition of the 1992 Consensus. This consensus, a foundational tenet of Beijing’s Taiwan policy, embodies the one-China principle, asserting that there is only one China, though allowing for differing interpretations of what "China" entails. For Beijing, the 1992 Consensus is the political cornerstone for dialogue and the peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Strait.
Zhang underscored the mainland’s resolve regarding the Taiwan issue, referencing the comprehensive report delivered at the 19th CPC National Congress by General Secretary Xi Jinping. The congress report reiterated the mainland’s commitment to the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, emphasizing peaceful reunification as the primary objective while not ruling out other options in specific circumstances. It also highlighted the importance of promoting economic and cultural exchanges, expanding opportunities for Taiwan compatriots on the mainland, and opposing "Taiwan independence" in all its forms.
The TAO director explicitly stated that cross-Strait relations have encountered significant challenges since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) assumed power in Taiwan in May 2016. He attributed these difficulties directly to the DPP’s refusal to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus, which led to the immediate suspension of official communication mechanisms between the mainland and the island. This communication breakdown has impacted various aspects of cross-Strait engagement, from economic cooperation to cultural exchanges, creating a climate of uncertainty.
Furthermore, Zhang criticized the DPP for allegedly pursuing policies of "de-Sinicization" on the island. He contended that these policies aim to sever cultural, educational, and social ties between Taiwan and the mainland, thereby undermining the shared historical and cultural heritage that binds the two sides. Zhang unequivocally declared that "Taiwan independence" remains the most significant obstacle to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, viewing it as a fundamental threat to regional stability and Beijing’s sovereignty claims.
The New Party’s Perspective and Call for Engagement
Yok Mu-ming, leading the New Party delegation, offered a perspective that largely aligned with Beijing’s narrative, emphasizing shared heritage and the potential for cross-Strait cooperation. He acknowledged the significance of the 19th CPC National Congress report, specifically citing General Secretary Xi Jinping’s commitment to respecting Taiwan’s existing social system and way of life. Yok also highlighted the mainland’s readiness to share its development opportunities with Taiwan compatriots, a point that resonates with many Taiwanese seeking economic advancement.
As a self-identified "Chinese person from Taiwan," Yok expressed his understanding of the mainland’s current development trajectory and future direction, gained through studying the CPC congress report. His remarks reflect a segment of Taiwan’s population that views closer ties with the mainland as beneficial for Taiwan’s economic future and national rejuvenation.
Yok lamented what he perceived as Taiwan’s internal focus on "stirring up conflict" in recent years, contrasting it with the mainland’s sustained emphasis on "growth and development." He noted that some Taiwanese people are increasingly looking to the mainland for opportunities and hope, particularly given Taiwan’s domestic political and economic challenges. This sentiment underscores a growing divergence within Taiwan regarding its future orientation and economic strategy.
The New Party chairman reaffirmed his party’s unwavering opposition to "Taiwan independence," advocating instead for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and the broader goal of "the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." This position is a cornerstone of the New Party’s platform and distinguishes it from the ruling DPP. The New Party, while a minority party in Taiwan, holds a consistent pro-unification stance, often serving as a conduit for dialogue with Beijing when official channels are closed.
Historical Context and Evolution of Cross-Strait Relations
The current state of cross-Strait relations is deeply rooted in historical developments following the Chinese Civil War in 1949, which resulted in the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and the retreat of the Republic of China (ROC) government to Taiwan. For decades, both sides maintained a policy of "no contact, no compromise, no negotiation."
A pivotal moment arrived in 1992 with the formulation of the "1992 Consensus." This understanding, reached between semi-official representatives from both sides, acknowledged "one China" but allowed each side to express its own interpretation of what "China" means. For Beijing, it means the PRC; for the then-ruling Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan, it meant the ROC. This ambiguity provided a crucial political foundation for subsequent cross-Strait dialogue and cooperation, leading to significant breakthroughs in economic, cultural, and people-to-people exchanges, particularly under KMT administrations in Taiwan.
However, the political landscape shifted dramatically with the election of Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP in Taiwan in 2016. The DPP, historically advocating for Taiwan’s de jure independence, has consistently refused to explicitly endorse the 1992 Consensus. While Tsai Ing-wen has pledged to maintain the "status quo" and uphold peace and stability, her administration’s non-recognition of the 1992 Consensus led Beijing to suspend all official communication mechanisms, including those between the TAO and Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC). This suspension marked a significant regression in cross-Strait ties, increasing tensions and reducing channels for conflict resolution.
The DPP’s "De-Sinicization" Allegations and Policy Implications
Zhang Zhijun’s accusation of the DPP pursuing "de-Sinicization" policies refers to a series of initiatives by the Tsai administration aimed at strengthening Taiwan’s distinct identity and reducing its reliance on mainland China. These policies often include curriculum reforms in education to emphasize Taiwanese history and culture, promoting indigenous languages, and fostering international recognition of Taiwan as a distinct entity.
From Beijing’s perspective, these efforts are seen as a veiled attempt to gradually distance Taiwan from its Chinese heritage and lay the groundwork for eventual independence, a red line for the PRC. The mainland views such policies as undermining the "one China" framework and eroding the cultural and social bonds that could facilitate reunification.
The implications of this policy divergence are profound. The suspension of official communications has hampered cooperation on issues ranging from criminal justice to disaster relief. Economically, while cross-Strait trade remains substantial, the political tensions create uncertainty for businesses operating across the Strait. Culturally, the alleged "de-Sinicization" efforts are perceived by Beijing as an affront to shared heritage and a deliberate attempt to erase commonalities.
Mainland’s Outreach and Incentives for Taiwan Residents
Despite the political freeze with the DPP government, Beijing has continued to pursue a strategy of direct engagement with the people of Taiwan. This approach involves offering a series of "favorable policies" designed to attract Taiwan residents to study, work, and live on the mainland. These incentives often include easier access to employment, social security benefits, educational opportunities, and housing, aiming to integrate Taiwan compatriots into mainland society and economy.
Such policies are a key component of Beijing’s "soft power" strategy, intended to demonstrate the benefits of closer integration and to foster a sense of shared identity and future. They also serve to create a constituency within Taiwan that has a vested interest in stable cross-Strait relations and closer ties with the mainland. Examples include simplified application processes for professional licenses, equal treatment in job markets, and support for entrepreneurial ventures by Taiwanese youth.
Data from various sources indicate a significant presence of Taiwanese individuals on the mainland. While precise numbers vary, estimates suggest hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese citizens work, study, or reside across the Strait. For instance, in 2018, it was reported that over 200,000 Taiwanese businesspeople and their families resided on the mainland, with a growing number of students and young professionals also seeking opportunities there. This demographic trend underscores the enduring economic and social pull of the mainland for many Taiwanese, regardless of the political climate.
The New Party’s Role in Taiwan’s Political Landscape
The New Party, established in 1993 by a faction of the Kuomintang (KMT) that felt the KMT was becoming too soft on cross-Strait issues, occupies a distinct, albeit niche, position in Taiwan’s multi-party democracy. Historically, it has been a staunch advocate for eventual unification with mainland China under the "one China" framework, often criticizing both the KMT and the DPP for what it perceives as deviation from this goal.
While the New Party’s electoral strength has waned since its peak in the 1990s, it continues to play a symbolic role as a clear voice for unification within Taiwan’s political discourse. Its consistent pro-unification stance makes it a natural interlocutor for Beijing, especially when official channels are closed. The New Party’s visit, therefore, is not just a diplomatic exchange but also a political statement, demonstrating Beijing’s willingness to engage with like-minded groups from Taiwan and to showcase the existence of voices within Taiwan that align with its "one China" principle.
The participation of Liu Jieyi, deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, in the meeting further underscored the importance Beijing attached to the New Party’s visit. Liu’s presence signals a high-level engagement and reinforces the official nature of the discussions, even if they are with a non-governmental delegation from Taiwan.
Broader Impact and Implications
The meeting between the TAO and the New Party carries several significant implications for cross-Strait relations and regional dynamics.
Firstly, it reinforces Beijing’s two-pronged strategy: isolating the DPP government due to its non-recognition of the 1992 Consensus, while simultaneously engaging with opposition parties and the Taiwanese public to promote its vision for peaceful development and eventual reunification. This approach aims to exert pressure on the DPP while cultivating support for unification among the Taiwanese populace.
Secondly, the visit serves as a public demonstration that dialogue between the mainland and Taiwan is still possible, albeit through unofficial or party-to-party channels. This helps Beijing project an image of being open to communication, even as official lines remain severed. For the New Party, the visit elevates its profile and allows it to articulate its platform on a prominent international stage, reinforcing its identity as a pro-unification force.
Thirdly, the explicit reiteration of the 19th CPC National Congress’s stance on Taiwan by Zhang Zhijun signals Beijing’s unwavering commitment to its core principles. The congress report is seen as a blueprint for China’s future, and its section on Taiwan outlines a consistent, long-term policy that prioritizes peaceful reunification but maintains the option of force as a last resort against "Taiwan independence" secessionist activities.
However, the meeting also highlights the deep divisions within Taiwan regarding its future relationship with the mainland. While the New Party advocates for closer ties and eventual unification, public opinion polls in Taiwan consistently show strong support for maintaining the status quo, and a growing sense of distinct Taiwanese identity, particularly among younger generations. The DPP’s electoral successes are largely built on this sentiment.
In conclusion, the meeting between China’s Taiwan Affairs Office and Taiwan’s New Party delegation underscores the complex and often challenging nature of cross-Strait relations. Amidst an official communication freeze, Beijing continues to leverage engagements with pro-unification parties to articulate its vision for peaceful development and reunification, while simultaneously offering incentives to the Taiwanese people. The New Party, in turn, seizes these opportunities to advocate for its platform. The future trajectory of cross-Strait relations will undoubtedly be shaped by these ongoing political maneuvers, domestic developments in Taiwan, and the broader geopolitical context. The path towards any form of resolution remains fraught with significant political and ideological hurdles.
Lina Hope
Rifan Muazin
