Sagoh
In a significant diplomatic engagement underscoring Beijing’s unwavering commitment to the one-China principle and the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations, a delegation representing Taiwan’s New Party visited Beijing on a recent Monday in early November 2017. The high-level meetings, which included discussions with top political adviser Yu Zhengsheng and State Council Taiwan Affairs Office head Zhang Zhijun, served to reaffirm shared foundational principles and express joint opposition to separatist activities that Beijing views as a grave threat to regional stability. This visit, occurring shortly after the pivotal 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), provided a crucial platform for dialogue outside official channels, which had largely been suspended following the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) ascent to power in Taiwan.
A Pivotal Meeting in Beijing
The delegation, led by Yok Mu-ming, chairman of the New Party, engaged in substantive discussions aimed at fostering closer ties and reiterating a collective vision for the future of cross-Straits relations. The primary agenda revolved around the peaceful development of relations and the ambitious goal of achieving the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation. Yu Zhengsheng, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), extended a warm welcome to the New Party representatives.
Yu Zhengsheng specifically lauded the New Party for its consistent and unwavering adherence to the 1992 Consensus since its inception. This consensus, which embodies the one-China principle, is considered by Beijing as the indispensable political foundation for any cross-Straits dialogue and engagement. Yu praised the party’s steadfast commitment to a peaceful approach in navigating the complex relationship between the mainland and Taiwan, contrasting it with what Beijing perceives as disruptive forces. His remarks highlighted the mainland’s appreciation for political entities in Taiwan that openly endorse the framework for dialogue established decades ago.
The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in October 2017, had just concluded, providing a fresh mandate and clarified guidelines for Beijing’s policy toward Taiwan. Yu Zhengsheng underscored that these guidelines, articulated during the congress, would shape the mainland’s future approach. During his opening address at the congress, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC, unequivocally stated that the one-China principle is the political bedrock of cross-Straits relations and issued a stern warning that any attempts to pursue "Taiwan independence" in any form would be resolutely defeated. Xi Jinping’s address also extended an olive branch, emphasizing that Taiwan would share in the vast development opportunities on the Chinese mainland, and its residents would increasingly enjoy the same treatment as mainland citizens when pursuing studies, starting businesses, seeking employment, or residing on the mainland. This policy, designed to foster deeper integration and demonstrate the tangible benefits of closer ties, aims to win hearts and minds across the Strait.
The 1992 Consensus: A Cornerstone of Cross-Straits Relations
To fully grasp the significance of the New Party’s visit and Beijing’s emphasis on the 1992 Consensus, it is crucial to understand the historical context and implications of this diplomatic understanding. The 1992 Consensus refers to a tacit agreement reached between the semi-official representatives of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) in 1992. The core of this understanding is "one China," with each side verbally acknowledging their own interpretation of what "one China" means. For Beijing, it means the PRC, while for Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) and allied parties like the New Party, it traditionally meant the ROC. This "one China, respective interpretations" formula allowed for a pragmatic framework that enabled cross-Straits dialogue and exchanges to flourish for over two decades.
The consensus emerged during a period of burgeoning unofficial contacts following the easing of tensions in the late 1980s. While never formally signed, it served as a political expedient, allowing both sides to sidestep the contentious issue of sovereignty and focus on practical cooperation. The KMT, which governed Taiwan for much of the post-1949 period, largely accepted this framework, viewing it as a basis for maintaining peace and prosperity. However, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which advocates for Taiwan’s de jure independence, has consistently refused to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus, arguing that it implies a subordination of Taiwan to the mainland and that its origins are disputed. This rejection by the DPP, particularly since its return to power in 2016 under President Tsai Ing-wen, has led to a significant deterioration in official cross-Straits communications, with Beijing suspending all dialogue channels. The New Party’s visit, therefore, represented one of the few avenues for political communication between Taiwan and the mainland at a time of heightened diplomatic freeze.
The New Party’s Enduring Stance
Yok Mu-ming, chairman of the New Party, reiterated his party’s unwavering commitment to the one-China principle and the promotion of peace during his meetings in Beijing. The New Party, established in 1993 by a faction that split from the Kuomintang, has historically maintained a staunch pro-unification stance, advocating for the eventual peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. While it holds a relatively small share of the electorate in Taiwan compared to the KMT and DPP, its consistent ideological alignment with Beijing’s core principles makes it a symbolically important interlocutor for the mainland.
The delegation’s agenda extended beyond high-level political affirmations. They also met with Zhang Zhijun, head of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, who is Beijing’s chief official responsible for cross-Straits policy. Both Zhang and Yok explicitly agreed on the imperative of upholding the one-China principle moving forward and expressed firm opposition to any separatist activities. This joint declaration underscored the unified front Beijing seeks to build with pro-unification forces in Taiwan against what it perceives as destabilizing elements.
Crucially, both sides agreed to establish and improve mechanisms of communication, share opinions on major issues in the relationship, and promote exchanges in all fields, with a particular emphasis on youth. This focus on younger generations reflects a strategic long-term vision to cultivate stronger cultural and economic ties, hoping to shape future public sentiment in Taiwan. Furthermore, they committed to creating a constructive and convenient environment for the development of Taiwan youth on the mainland, including opportunities for study, employment, and entrepreneurship. This policy is a direct implementation of the directives articulated by Xi Jinping at the 19th CPC National Congress, aiming to integrate Taiwan residents more deeply into the mainland’s economic and social fabric.
Beijing’s Concerns: The Rise of Separatist Sentiments
During his meeting with the New Party delegation, Zhang Zhijun candidly addressed the challenges facing cross-Straits relations. He directly attributed the current difficulties to the island’s Democratic Progressive Party’s refusal to clearly express support for the 1992 Consensus and the one-China principle. This refusal, he explained, led directly to the mainland’s suspension of official communications with the island, plunging cross-Straits relations into a period of uncertainty and diplomatic deadlock.
Zhang Zhijun voiced strong concerns about what he described as a "Taiwan independence" force that had recently stirred up the island, proposing the removal of "Chinese mainland elements" in various fields. He detailed how these forces were attempting to sever historical ties between Taiwan and the mainland, diminish public awareness among Taiwan people that they are part of the Chinese nation, and limit many cultural influences on the island. Examples often cited by Beijing include efforts to revise history textbooks, change official nomenclature, and dilute cultural connections.
He further warned that some proponents of "Taiwan independence" were actively pushing for amendments to laws and even proposing changes to the island’s constitution. "This shows that separatist activities and the group supporting ‘independence’ pose the most serious threat to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations," Zhang stated emphatically. He urged people from both sides of the Strait to remain vigilant and firmly oppose such activities, emphasizing that the consequences of such actions could be severe and destabilizing for the entire region. This reflects Beijing’s long-standing position that while it prefers peaceful reunification, it reserves the right to use "all necessary means," including force, to prevent Taiwan’s formal independence.
Economic and Cultural Interdependence: A Shared Future
Despite the political tensions, economic and cultural ties between the mainland and Taiwan remain robust, underscoring the deep interdependence that has developed over decades. The mainland has consistently been Taiwan’s largest trading partner, export market, and destination for investment. In 2017, cross-Straits trade volume still hovered around $150-180 billion annually, with significant Taiwanese investment in mainland industries, ranging from manufacturing to services. Hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese businesspeople and their families reside on the mainland, contributing to its economy and fostering people-to-people connections.
Beijing’s policy of offering "same treatment" to Taiwan residents pursuing education, employment, or entrepreneurship on the mainland is a deliberate strategy to deepen these ties. By removing barriers and providing incentives, Beijing aims to create a compelling alternative for Taiwan’s youth and professionals, hoping that closer personal and economic integration will gradually foster a sense of shared identity and diminish calls for independence. Data from before 2016 showed a significant flow of mainland tourists to Taiwan, though this has seen a sharp decline following the DPP’s electoral victory and Beijing’s subsequent curtailment of group tours. The continued emphasis on youth exchanges by the New Party and Beijing signals a long-term investment in cultivating future generations with a stronger affinity for cross-Straits unity.
The Broader Geopolitical Context
The cross-Straits dynamic is not merely an internal matter but is intricately linked to broader geopolitical currents, particularly involving the United States. The U.S. maintains a "one China policy" that acknowledges Beijing’s position but also adheres to the Taiwan Relations Act, which commits the U.S. to providing Taiwan with the means to defend itself. This strategic ambiguity has long been a delicate balancing act, designed to deter both a mainland invasion and a Taiwanese declaration of independence.
Beijing’s increasingly assertive stance on Taiwan, particularly following the 19th CPC National Congress, signals a heightened resolve to prevent any moves towards independence. This is often accompanied by increased military drills in the Taiwan Strait and diplomatic pressure on countries to cut ties with Taiwan, further isolating the island internationally. The New Party’s visit, therefore, serves a dual purpose for Beijing: to reinforce its narrative of internal support for unification and to send a clear message to the international community that pro-unification forces exist and are actively engaged in dialogue.
Implications for Cross-Straits Stability
The visit of the New Party delegation to Beijing, while not resolving the core political deadlock, provided a critical barometer of cross-Straits sentiment and Beijing’s strategic priorities. For Beijing, it was an opportunity to:
- Reaffirm the 1992 Consensus: Reinforce its non-negotiable status as the prerequisite for official dialogue.
- Isolate the DPP: Highlight the DPP’s perceived intransigence and demonstrate that alternative channels for communication exist with pro-unification parties.
- Signal Resolve: Underscore the mainland’s firm stance against "Taiwan independence" and its commitment to national rejuvenation.
- Promote Integration: Advance policies aimed at deepening economic and social ties between Taiwan residents and the mainland.
For the New Party, the visit offered a platform to demonstrate its political relevance and influence within the broader cross-Straits discourse, aligning itself with Beijing’s vision for a unified future. For Taiwan as a whole, the episode underscored the growing pressure from Beijing, both diplomatic and potentially economic, for the DPP government to reconsider its position on the 1992 Consensus.
Looking ahead, the cross-Straits relationship is likely to remain complex and fraught with challenges. While the mainland continues to advocate for peaceful development and offers incentives for integration, its stern warnings against "Taiwan independence" forces indicate a diminishing tolerance for actions perceived as moving towards de jure separation. The continued engagement with parties like the New Party represents Beijing’s strategy to foster a "united front" within Taiwan, while simultaneously maintaining pressure on the ruling DPP to acknowledge the political framework Beijing deems essential for dialogue and stability. The future trajectory will largely depend on how these various forces—Beijing’s assertive policies, Taiwan’s internal political dynamics, and the geopolitical calculations of international actors—continue to interact and evolve.
Ammar Sabilarrohman
Nana
