Nana Muazin
A high-level meeting in Beijing on Monday saw top political adviser Yu Zhengsheng engage with a delegation from Taiwan’s New Party, underscoring the mainland’s unwavering commitment to the one-China principle and its rejection of any moves towards "Taiwan independence." The discussions centered on fostering the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and advancing the ambitious goal of the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation, a central tenet of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) long-term vision. This engagement arrives at a critical juncture for cross-Straits dynamics, marked by a freeze in official communication channels between Beijing and Taipei since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) assumed power in Taiwan in 2016.
Historical Context: The 1992 Consensus and Cross-Straits Relations
The bedrock of cross-Straits dialogue for decades has been the 1992 Consensus, a tacit understanding reached between representatives of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. This consensus acknowledges that there is "one China" but allows for differing interpretations of what "China" means. For Beijing, the one-China principle is non-negotiable and refers to the People’s Republic of China. For the Kuomintang (KMT) and allied parties in Taiwan, it traditionally allowed for the Republic of China (Taiwan’s official name) to also be considered part of "one China." This constructive ambiguity paved the way for significant advancements in cross-Straits economic, cultural, and people-to-people exchanges, particularly during the KMT’s administration under Ma Ying-jeou from 2008 to 2016.
The 1992 Consensus is widely regarded by Beijing as the political foundation for cross-Straits relations, enabling dialogue and interaction. Its rejection by the current DPP administration in Taiwan has led to a significant downturn in relations, with official communication mechanisms suspended. This backdrop lends particular significance to the New Party’s visit, as it represents one of the few avenues for non-official, yet politically weighty, dialogue between the two sides.
The New Party’s Enduring Stance
Yu Zhengsheng, then Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National Committee and a member of the powerful Politburo Standing Committee, lauded the New Party for its consistent and unbroken stance in upholding the 1992 Consensus since its establishment in 1993. Formed by a splinter group from the KMT, the New Party has always advocated for eventual unification with the mainland and staunchly opposes Taiwan independence. Their position is often seen as being in close alignment with Beijing’s core principles on Taiwan.
Yok Mu-ming, chairman of the New Party and head of the Taiwan delegation, reiterated his party’s firm commitment to the one-China principle and its dedication to promoting peace across the Taiwan Strait. This consistent ideological alignment makes the New Party a valuable interlocutor for Beijing, especially when official channels with the DPP-led government remain closed. Their visit serves as a symbolic affirmation of a segment of Taiwan’s political landscape that shares Beijing’s foundational views on the island’s future. While the New Party’s electoral influence in Taiwan is relatively limited compared to the KMT or DPP, its ideological clarity and pro-unification stance offer Beijing a consistent voice for its policy objectives.
Key Discussions in Beijing: A Reaffirmation of Principles
Beyond the meeting with Yu Zhengsheng, the Taiwan delegation also held talks with Zhang Zhijun, then head of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). The TAO is the primary administrative body responsible for handling mainland China’s policies towards Taiwan. Both Zhang and Yok reaffirmed the imperative of upholding the one-China principle as the guiding framework for future cross-Straits interactions. They expressed strong opposition to separatist activities and pledged concerted efforts towards achieving peaceful relations.
A significant outcome of their discussions was the agreement to establish and improve communication mechanisms, facilitate the sharing of opinions on major issues, and promote exchanges across all fields. A particular emphasis was placed on youth exchanges, with both sides agreeing to create a constructive and convenient environment for the development of Taiwan’s youth on the mainland. This focus on the younger generation reflects a strategic effort by Beijing to cultivate stronger ties and shared understanding, potentially counteracting what it perceives as growing pro-independence sentiment among some younger Taiwanese. Such initiatives are crucial for long-term cross-Straits integration, aiming to foster a sense of shared identity and common future.
The 19th CPC National Congress and Taiwan Policy
The meetings took place shortly after the conclusion of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October, an event that comprehensively outlined the Party’s policy directions for the next five years and beyond. Yu Zhengsheng highlighted that the Congress further clarified the guidelines and policies addressing Taiwan, reinforcing the mainland’s consistent stance.
In his opening address to the delegates during the Congress, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC, unequivocally declared the one-China principle as the indispensable political foundation of cross-Straits relations. He issued a stern warning that any attempts to move towards "Taiwan independence" in any form would be resolutely defeated. This statement reiterated Beijing’s firm red line on the issue, signaling that while peaceful reunification is the preferred path, the option of using force to prevent independence remains on the table, consistent with China’s Anti-Secession Law.
However, Xi’s address also extended an olive branch, emphasizing that Taiwan would share in the vast development opportunities on the Chinese mainland. He articulated a vision where Taiwan residents would enjoy the same treatment as mainland citizens when pursuing studies, starting businesses, seeking jobs, or choosing to live on the mainland. This policy aims to deepen economic and social integration, offering tangible benefits to Taiwanese individuals and businesses as an incentive for closer ties. The mainland has progressively implemented measures to facilitate such integration, from offering specific employment opportunities to simplifying administrative procedures for Taiwanese residents.
Challenges Posed by Separatist Sentiments
Zhang Zhijun voiced significant concerns regarding the trajectory of cross-Straits relations, attributing the current challenges to the DPP’s refusal to explicitly endorse the one-China principle. This refusal, he explained, directly led to the mainland’s suspension of official communication channels with the island, creating a diplomatic impasse.
Zhang specifically pointed to a "Taiwan independence" force that, in his view, had been actively stirring up the island. He cited proposals for the removal of "Chinese mainland elements" in various fields, a phenomenon often referred to as "de-Sinicization." This involves efforts to revise school curricula to downplay Chinese history and culture, renaming state-owned enterprises or public institutions to remove "China" from their titles, and other measures aimed at asserting a distinct Taiwanese identity separate from mainland China.
"Its aim is to cut the historical ties between Taiwan and the mainland, reduce public awareness that Taiwan people are part of the Chinese nation, and limit many cultural influences on the island," Zhang asserted. He further warned that some proponents of "Taiwan independence" were pushing for amending the law, even proposing changes to the island’s constitution. "This shows that separatist activities and the group supporting ‘independence’ pose the most serious threat to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations," Zhang concluded, urging people from both sides to be vigilant and firmly oppose such activities. These actions are viewed by Beijing as direct challenges to its sovereignty claims and a dangerous escalation of separatist tendencies.
Data and Trends in Cross-Straits Interactions
Despite political tensions, economic ties between mainland China and Taiwan remain robust, reflecting a deep level of interdependence. According to data from Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, cross-Straits trade volume consistently surpasses hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars annually. The mainland is Taiwan’s largest trading partner, its largest export market, and a significant source of its trade surplus. Taiwanese companies have invested massively in the mainland, establishing manufacturing bases and service industries that have been integral to both economies’ growth. By the end of 2017, cumulative Taiwanese investment in the mainland was estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars, creating millions of jobs and integrating supply chains.
People-to-people exchanges also flourished before the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent political cooling. Millions of mainland tourists visited Taiwan annually, contributing significantly to Taiwan’s tourism industry. Cultural and academic exchanges, student programs, and family visits were commonplace, fostering a complex web of interactions that transcend political divides. While the political climate has impacted these exchanges, particularly tourism and official interactions, the underlying economic and social connections remain powerful. The mainland’s proactive policy of offering "same treatment" to Taiwanese residents is designed to further deepen these non-governmental ties, making the prospect of separation less appealing over time.
Implications for Taiwan’s Political Landscape
The New Party’s visit to Beijing underscores the internal divisions within Taiwan regarding its relationship with mainland China. While the DPP, currently in power, emphasizes Taiwan’s sovereignty and a distinct national identity, parties like the New Party and a segment of the KMT advocate for closer ties and eventual unification under a "one China" framework. The mainland’s engagement with the New Party signals its strategy of engaging with pro-unification forces and isolating the independence-leaning DPP.
For the DPP, Beijing’s hardline stance on the 1992 Consensus and its rejection of "de-Sinicization" efforts present a significant challenge. The suspension of official communication channels limits their ability to directly address mainland concerns or negotiate on issues affecting Taiwan’s economy and security. The mainland’s strategy aims to exert pressure on the DPP to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus, or at least its core meaning of "one China," as a precondition for resuming dialogue. This creates a difficult balancing act for the DPP, which must cater to its domestic political base that largely rejects the consensus while also managing the potentially destabilizing impact of frozen cross-Straits relations.
Broader Geopolitical Context
The stability of the Taiwan Strait is a critical concern for regional and global security. Any significant escalation of tensions between mainland China and Taiwan would have profound geopolitical implications, potentially drawing in major powers like the United States, which maintains unofficial relations with Taiwan and provides it with defensive capabilities under the Taiwan Relations Act. Beijing’s consistent reiteration of its one-China principle and its opposition to "Taiwan independence" is not only an internal policy matter but also a message to the international community, urging adherence to the "one China" policy recognized by most countries. The ongoing dialogue, even through non-official channels, serves to manage expectations and reiterate positions, preventing misunderstandings that could lead to unintended consequences.
Conclusion and Outlook
The meetings between mainland Chinese officials and the New Party delegation served as a clear reaffirmation of Beijing’s steadfast policy towards Taiwan: upholding the one-China principle, rejecting "Taiwan independence" in any form, and promoting peaceful development and national rejuvenation. While official communication with the DPP-led government remains suspended, these non-official engagements highlight Beijing’s multi-pronged approach to Taiwan, which includes engaging with sympathetic political forces on the island, offering economic and social incentives for integration, and issuing stern warnings against separatist activities. The path forward for cross-Straits relations remains complex and fraught with challenges, largely contingent on how the DPP navigates the fundamental issue of the 1992 Consensus and how Beijing continues to balance its firm stance with its stated goal of peaceful reunification. The calls for increased youth exchanges and improved communication mechanisms, even in the absence of official dialogue, signal a long-term strategic vision aimed at gradually weaving the two sides closer together, ultimately seeking a resolution to the longstanding division.
Asep Darmawan
Nana
