Asep Darmawan
Beijing, China – Zhang Zhijun, Director of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), held a significant meeting on Monday with a delegation from Taiwan’s New Party, underscoring Beijing’s unwavering commitment to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and the one-China principle. The high-level talks, which took place in Beijing, aimed to foster deeper understanding and cooperation at a time when official communication channels between mainland China and Taiwan remain suspended. The visit by the New Party, a staunch advocate for eventual unification with the mainland, is seen as a strategic outreach by Beijing to political forces in Taiwan that align with its core principles, particularly in the wake of the recent 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
During the meeting, Director Zhang Zhijun extended commendation to the New Party for its consistent efforts in promoting the peaceful development of cross-Straits ties and for its clear recognition of the 1992 Consensus, which forms the bedrock of the one-China principle. Zhang highlighted the timely nature of the visit, occurring shortly after the conclusion of the 19th CPC National Congress, and reiterated the mainland’s comprehensive policy framework for addressing the issue of Taiwan, as articulated in the landmark report delivered during the congress. He emphasized that the mainland’s approach is guided by a long-term vision for national rejuvenation and peaceful reunification.
Zhang did not shy away from addressing the current challenges plaguing cross-Straits relations. He pointed to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan’s ruling party, as the primary source of tension due to its persistent refusal to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus. This refusal, he explained, has led directly to the cessation of official dialogue and communication mechanisms between Beijing and Taipei since 2016. Furthermore, Zhang criticized the DPP’s pursuit of “de-Sinofication” policies on the island, which he characterized as deliberate attempts to sever cultural, educational, and social ties between Taiwan and the mainland. He unequivocally stated that any pursuit of "Taiwan independence" constitutes a significant obstacle to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and poses a fundamental threat to regional stability.
Leading the Taiwan delegation, Yok Mu-ming, Chairman of the New Party, characterized their visit as an "innovative trip," signaling a fresh approach to cross-Straits engagement amidst the prevailing political impasse. Yok echoed sentiments from General Secretary Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th CPC National Congress, specifically noting the mainland’s stated respect for Taiwan’s current social system and way of life. He also highlighted Beijing’s readiness to share development opportunities with "Taiwan compatriots," a policy aimed at drawing Taiwan residents closer to the mainland’s economic orbit. Yok, identifying himself as a Chinese person from Taiwan, conveyed his appreciation for the mainland’s development trajectory and strategic direction, insights he gleaned from studying the congress report. He expressed regret that Taiwan has, in recent years, been preoccupied with internal political strife, while the mainland has maintained an unwavering focus on economic growth and national development. This disparity, he suggested, has led some people in Taiwan to place their hopes and aspirations in the mainland’s future.
The 19th CPC National Congress and Taiwan Policy Reaffirmation
The meeting’s timing, immediately following the 19th CPC National Congress in October 2017, lent particular weight to Zhang Zhijun’s remarks. General Secretary Xi Jinping’s extensive report to the Congress included a significant section on Taiwan, reiterating Beijing’s steadfast policy. Key takeaways from the report emphasized the CPC’s adherence to the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, advocating for peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and eventual national reunification. Xi’s report underscored that the future of Taiwan lies in reunification with the mainland and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. While stressing peaceful means, the report also contained a firm warning, often dubbed the "six any" against "Taiwan independence," stating that the mainland would never allow any person, any organization, or any political party to separate any part of Chinese territory from China at any time or in any form. This resolute stance serves as the overarching framework for Beijing’s current engagement with Taiwan.
Understanding the 1992 Consensus
The 1992 Consensus, a central point of contention and discussion, refers to a tacit understanding reached between representatives of the Chinese Communist Party and Taiwan’s then-ruling Kuomintang (KMT) in 1992. It essentially states that both sides of the Taiwan Strait acknowledge there is "one China," but agree to differ on the interpretation of what "one China" means. For Beijing, it means the People’s Republic of China. For the KMT at the time, it implied the Republic of China (Taiwan’s official name). This diplomatic ambiguity proved crucial for facilitating cross-Straits dialogue and exchanges for over two decades. However, the DPP has consistently refused to recognize this consensus, viewing it as an acceptance of Beijing’s "one China" framework that undermines Taiwan’s sovereignty. This rejection by the DPP since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in May 2016 has been the direct cause of the official communication freeze.
The New Party and Taiwan’s Political Landscape
The New Party, established in 1993 by a group of KMT members who broke away due to disagreements over the KMT’s perceived move towards localization and away from a strong pro-unification stance, represents a smaller, but vocal, segment of Taiwan’s political spectrum. It firmly advocates for the eventual unification of Taiwan with mainland China under the "one country, two systems" framework, similar to Hong Kong and Macau. Their political ideology aligns closely with Beijing’s stated goals for cross-Straits relations. While the New Party holds limited seats in Taiwan’s legislature, its willingness to engage directly with Beijing on these terms serves a crucial purpose for the mainland. Such visits demonstrate that voices within Taiwan still support the one-China principle and peaceful unification, offering Beijing an avenue to engage with the Taiwanese populace outside of the official, currently stalled, government channels. This strategy allows Beijing to portray itself as engaging with a diverse array of Taiwanese society, rather than being solely defined by its standoff with the DPP.
The Democratic Progressive Party’s Stance and "De-Sinofication"
The DPP, led by President Tsai Ing-wen, came to power in 2016 on a platform that emphasizes Taiwan’s distinct identity and autonomy. While Tsai has pledged to maintain the "status quo" in cross-Straits relations, her government’s refusal to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus has been interpreted by Beijing as a rejection of the political foundation for dialogue. The "de-Sinofication" policies mentioned by Zhang Zhijun refer to various initiatives undertaken by the DPP administration aimed at strengthening Taiwan’s unique cultural and historical narrative, often by downplaying or removing elements that emphasize a shared Chinese heritage. This includes revisions to school curricula, promoting indigenous languages, and re-evaluating historical narratives to center on Taiwan’s own development rather than its connection to mainland China. These efforts are viewed by Beijing as attempts to gradually move Taiwan away from its Chinese identity, paving the way for eventual independence, which Beijing considers a red line.
Timeline of Cross-Straits Developments
The history of cross-Straits relations is complex and marked by periods of tension and rapprochement:
- 1949: The Chinese Civil War ends with the Communist Party establishing the People’s Republic of China on the mainland, and the Kuomintang retreating to Taiwan, establishing the Republic of China government.
- Late 1980s: Cross-Straits relations begin to thaw, with Taiwan lifting restrictions on travel to the mainland.
- 1992: The "1992 Consensus" is reached, enabling semi-official exchanges.
- 2008-2016: Under KMT President Ma Ying-jeou, cross-Straits relations experience an unprecedented period of warmth and cooperation, with increased trade, tourism, and direct flights.
- May 2016: DPP President Tsai Ing-wen takes office, leading to a suspension of official communications as her government refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus.
- October 2017: The 19th CPC National Congress reaffirms Beijing’s firm stance on Taiwan, stressing peaceful reunification but warning against independence.
- November 2017: The New Party delegation visits Beijing, aiming to promote continued engagement despite official chill.
Economic Interdependence and People-to-People Ties
Despite the political freeze, economic ties between mainland China and Taiwan remain robust. Mainland China has consistently been Taiwan’s largest trading partner, export market, and destination for outward investment. In 2017, for instance, bilateral trade continued to register significant figures, demonstrating the deep economic interdependence that transcends political differences. Taiwan’s industries, particularly in electronics and manufacturing, heavily rely on mainland supply chains and markets. Furthermore, people-to-people exchanges, while potentially impacted by political rhetoric, continue. Millions of Taiwanese have visited, worked, or studied on the mainland, and vice versa.
In line with this, mainland China has proactively implemented a series of "favorable policies" to attract and integrate Taiwan residents. These policies aim to provide Taiwan compatriots with opportunities to study, work, live, and start businesses on the mainland, enjoying similar treatment to mainland citizens in various fields. Examples include easier access to employment opportunities in specific sectors, recognition of professional qualifications, streamlined procedures for residency permits, and access to social services. These measures are designed to encourage deeper integration and foster a sense of shared community, subtly circumventing the official political stalemate.
Official Responses and Broader Implications
Liu Jieyi, then Deputy Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, also attended the meeting, signaling the importance Beijing placed on this engagement. An Fengshan, spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, later confirmed that the eight-day visit by the New Party delegation was scheduled to conclude on Saturday. An reiterated that the visit’s objectives were squarely focused on promoting the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations, advancing the process toward the peaceful reunification of China, and contributing to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
The New Party’s visit carries significant implications. For Beijing, it serves as a powerful symbol that not all voices in Taiwan align with the DPP’s sovereignty-focused narrative. It allows the mainland to engage directly with pro-unification forces and reinforce its message to the Taiwanese public that peaceful development and shared opportunities are available, irrespective of the official government-to-government freeze. This strategy aims to build grassroots support and create a counter-narrative to the DPP’s policies.
For Taiwan, such visits highlight the internal divisions within its political landscape regarding its future relationship with mainland China. While the New Party represents a minority view, its engagement with Beijing underscores the persistent debate over Taiwan’s identity and direction. The visit also puts pressure on the DPP government, which is caught between its domestic political base that desires greater autonomy and Beijing’s firm stance on the one-China principle.
In a broader regional context, the ongoing tensions across the Taiwan Strait remain a critical point of geopolitical concern. The deepening divide between Beijing and Taipei, exacerbated by the lack of official communication, increases the risk of miscalculation. Beijing’s strategy of simultaneously pressuring the DPP while reaching out to pro-unification groups and the Taiwanese populace through favorable policies indicates a multi-pronged approach designed to achieve its long-term goal of national reunification. The New Party’s "innovative trip" is a clear manifestation of this strategy, seeking to cultivate allies and narratives that support Beijing’s vision for cross-Straits relations, even as official channels remain frozen. The path forward for cross-Straits relations remains complex, characterized by fundamental ideological differences and a strategic contest for influence over Taiwan’s future.
