Nana Muazin
The passage of the National Ethnic Unity and Progress Law represents a definitive shift in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) approach to managing its diverse population of 56 recognized ethnic groups. While previous decades were characterized by a nominal focus on "regional ethnic autonomy," the new legislative framework codifies a transition toward a more aggressive assimilationist phase. This law does not merely encourage social harmony; it provides a comprehensive legal basis for the integration of ethnic and religious identities into a singular, state-defined national identity. By examining the specific articles of the law, the ideological foundations laid in recent years, and the broader global context, a clearer picture emerges of the PRC’s long-term strategy for internal governance and its implications for international law.
The Legal Framework of Integration and Assimilation
The National Ethnic Unity and Progress Law serves as the high-level legal architecture for the "Sinification" (Zhongguohua) of ethnic and religious life. Central to the law is the effort to create a shared common identity for the Chinese people, often referred to by the leadership as "casting the sense of community for the Chinese nation." Unlike previous regulations that treated ethnicity and religion as distinct cultural categories, this law frequently groups them together.
Articles 12 and 46 of the law define ethnicity and religion as core aspects of group identity that must be aligned with the state’s objectives. Conversely, Articles 10, 40, and 53 characterize these identities as potentially divisive forces if left unmanaged. The most significant alignment occurs in Article 62, which discusses criminal offenses. This article explicitly groups "terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic division" into a single category of threat. This legal grouping reflects the "Three Evil Forces" doctrine that has guided China’s security policy in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Tibet for over a decade, but it now applies as a standardized national legal principle.
Furthermore, the law connects ethnic and religious governance to the ongoing "Campaign to Combat Underworld Forces" (Saohei Chu’e). Local implementation rules increasingly categorize ethnic and religious leaders who operate outside of state-sanctioned organizations as potential disruptors of stable governance or "black and evil forces." By framing traditional community leadership as a security risk, the state justifies the replacement of organic social structures with Party-state oversight.
A Chronology of Policy Evolution
The 2026 law is the culmination of a decade-long shift in ethnic theory and practice. Understanding this transition requires looking at the chronological development of "Second Generation Ethnic Policy" in China:
- 1984: The Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy. This era focused on granting minority regions specific rights regarding language, education, and limited self-governance, following the Soviet model of ethnic pluralism.
- 2012–2014: The Theoretical Shift. Following unrest in Lhasa (2008) and Ürümqi (2009), scholars like Hu Angang and Ma Rong began advocating for a "Second Generation" policy that favored the "melting pot" model over the "salad bowl" model. This approach emphasized national integration and the erosion of ethnic distinctions in favor of a singular "Chinese" (Zhonghua) identity.
- 2017: The Beijing Declaration. During the South-South Human Rights Forum, Beijing articulated a vision where the rights of minority groups are conditional upon their "integration into the local society" and observance of the Constitution. This established the ideological groundwork for the current law.
- 2021: The Central Ethnic Affairs Conference. President Xi Jinping formally prioritized "casting the sense of community for the Chinese nation" as the "main line" of all ethnic work, signaling that autonomy was being superseded by unity.
- 2026: Codification. The National Ethnic Unity and Progress Law transforms these policy directives into a formal legal mandate with extraterritorial reach.
Data and Demographic Context
China’s ethnic minorities comprise approximately 8.5% of the total population, or roughly 125 million people. While the Han majority makes up 91.5%, the minority populations occupy roughly 60% of China’s total landmass, much of which is located in strategically sensitive border regions.
The state’s push for assimilation is backed by significant fiscal investment in "Sinification" programs. According to various government work reports, five-year plans have been established for the "Sinification" of Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. These plans involve:
- Architectural Modification: Removing foreign or traditional ethnic styles from religious buildings to align with Chinese aesthetic standards.
- Scriptural Reinterpretation: Encouraging religious leaders to find "Core Socialist Values" within their faiths and downplay doctrines that might conflict with state policy.
- Language Standardization: Replacing minority-language instruction with Standard Mandarin (Putonghua) in schools and religious institutions.
The Doctrine of "Freedom from Religion"
One of the most impactful aspects of the new law and its related regulations is the restriction on the intergenerational transmission of culture and religion. The state interprets the "right to choose one’s belief" as a protection for children from religious influence.
Under current interpretations, because minors lack the legal capacity to make an informed choice about faith, the state prohibits their participation in religious activities. This includes a ban on attending religious services, participating in summer camps with religious themes, or receiving traditional religious education. By limiting the involvement of the youth, the state effectively creates a demographic "break" in cultural continuity. Taken together with the Sinification of the clergy—where religious leaders must follow the leadership of the Communist Party—the long-term impact is a reduction in the scope and longevity of minority cultures as distinct entities.
Global Context and Comparative Analysis
China’s move toward codifying assimilation occurs within a broader global trend of rising nationalism and the pursuit of cohesive national narratives. The PRC’s rhetoric of "unity" and "solidarity" stands in contrast to nationalist movements in the West, which often use exclusionary or anti-immigrant language. However, the Chinese model of "incorporation" bears a functional resemblance to historical assimilationist policies elsewhere, such as the residential school systems for indigenous populations in the United States and Canada during the 19th and 20th centuries.
The 2017 Beijing Declaration from the South-South Human Rights Forum provides the international justification for this approach. Article 6 of the declaration states that "religious minorities have the same obligation to adapt to their local environment." This effectively flips the traditional international understanding of minority rights; instead of the state having the primary obligation to protect the minority’s distinctiveness, the minority has the primary obligation to adapt to the state’s "mainstream" culture.
Analysis of Extraterritorial Application
A point of significant international concern is Article 63 of the law, which claims extraterritorial jurisdiction:
“Organizations and individuals outside the territory of the P.R.C. that commit acts aimed at the P.R.C. that undermine ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division are to be pursued for legal responsibility in accordance with law.”
While this provision has sparked alarm, legal analysts note that it is consistent with Article 6 of China’s Criminal Law, which authorizes "territorial jurisdiction" when the consequences of a crime are felt within China. This is a common legal principle used globally to prosecute crimes like cyber-attacks or financial fraud committed from abroad.
The true concern, however, lies not in the reach of the law, but in the definition of the crimes. In the context of "ethnic unity," activities that are protected as free speech or religious expression in other countries—such as advocating for Tibetan cultural preservation or criticizing policies in Xinjiang—could be classified as "creating ethnic division" under the PRC’s legal framework. This creates a "long-arm" effect where scholars, activists, and members of the diaspora may face legal repercussions or "public interest litigation" initiated by Chinese procuratorates, even if they have never set foot in mainland China.
Implications for the Future
The National Ethnic Unity and Progress Law signals that the era of "autonomy" as a primary pillar of Chinese governance is over. The focus has moved entirely to "integration," where the state acts as the arbiter of which cultural traits are permissible and which are "extremist."
For the international community, this poses a challenge to established human rights norms. China’s emphasis on "stability" and "development" as the primary human rights suggests a competing model of governance that prioritizes state security over individual or group cultural expression. As the law moves into the implementation phase, the global community will likely see an increase in legal friction, particularly as China seeks to apply its standards of "ethnic unity" to the activities of individuals and organizations operating globally.
Ultimately, the law seeks to resolve the "ethnic question" in China not through the celebration of diversity, but through the management and eventual dissolution of distinct identities into a single, state-aligned national fabric. The success or failure of this policy will likely define China’s internal social stability and its international reputation for the coming generation.
Ammar Sabilarrohman
Rifan Muazin
