Lina Irawan
A high-level meeting in Beijing in late 2017 underscored the People’s Republic of China’s unwavering commitment to the one-China principle and its strategy for cross-Straits relations, particularly in the wake of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Top political adviser Yu Zhengsheng engaged with a delegation from Taiwan’s New Party, led by its chairman, Yok Mu-ming, to deliberate on the peaceful advancement of cross-Straits ties and the shared vision of the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation. This dialogue served as a significant reaffirmation of Beijing’s established policies and a platform to address perceived threats to stability from within Taiwan.
The New Party, a prominent voice within Taiwan’s pro-unification camp, received commendation from Yu Zhengsheng for its consistent upholding of the 1992 Consensus, a foundational understanding that embodies the one-China principle. This unwavering stance, maintained since the party’s inception, along with its advocacy for peaceful relations, was highlighted as crucial for regional stability. The meeting not only provided an opportunity for direct communication but also showcased Beijing’s willingness to engage with political entities in Taiwan that align with its core principles, especially amidst a period of frosty official relations with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration.
The 1992 Consensus and One-China Principle: Bedrock of Beijing’s Policy
Central to the discussions was the 1992 Consensus, a political understanding reached between the semi-official representatives of mainland China and Taiwan in 1992. It essentially acknowledges that there is "one China" but allows for differing interpretations of what "China" means by each side. For Beijing, this consensus is the political foundation for cross-Straits dialogue and interaction. Its rejection by Taiwan’s ruling DPP since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016 has led to the suspension of official communication mechanisms, creating a vacuum that non-governmental and party-to-party exchanges like this New Party delegation seek to partially fill.
The one-China principle, a core tenet of Beijing’s foreign policy, asserts that there is only one sovereign state under the name China, and that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. This principle is internationally recognized by a vast majority of countries that maintain diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Beijing views any challenge to this principle as an existential threat to its territorial integrity and national sovereignty. The CPC’s 19th National Congress, held in October 2017, further solidified these guidelines and policies concerning Taiwan, with General Secretary Xi Jinping unequivocally stating that the one-China principle forms the political bedrock of cross-Straits relations and that any attempts to move towards "Taiwan independence" in any form would be resolutely defeated.
Historical Context of Cross-Straits Relations: A Century of Division and Dialogue
The complex tapestry of cross-Straits relations traces its origins back to the Chinese Civil War, which culminated in 1949 with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on the mainland and the retreat of the Republic of China government, led by the Kuomintang (KMT), to Taiwan. For decades, direct communication and travel were largely cut off, and military tensions remained high. The geopolitical landscape began to shift in the late 1970s and 1980s, marked by the United States’ diplomatic recognition of Beijing in 1979 and the subsequent passage of the Taiwan Relations Act.
The early 1990s saw a thawing of relations, leading to the semi-official talks that produced the 1992 Consensus. This period ushered in an era of increased economic engagement and people-to-people exchanges, particularly during the KMT’s presidency under Ma Ying-jeou from 2008 to 2016. During these eight years, direct flights were established, tourism flourished, and trade agreements like the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) were signed, significantly deepening cross-Straits interdependence. However, the election of Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP in 2016, a party traditionally associated with a more pro-independence stance, marked a significant downturn. Her administration’s refusal to explicitly endorse the 1992 Consensus led Beijing to suspend official communication channels, plunging cross-Straits relations into a period of heightened uncertainty and reduced dialogue.
The New Party’s Role: Advocating for Peace and Unification
The New Party, founded in 1993 by a group of KMT members who broke away due to disagreements over KMT’s localization policies and what they perceived as a drift away from the one-China principle, has consistently positioned itself as a staunch advocate for eventual unification with mainland China. Its delegation to Beijing, therefore, carries significant symbolic weight, representing a segment of Taiwan’s political spectrum that actively promotes Beijing’s core policy objectives. Chairman Yok Mu-ming reiterated the party’s steadfast commitment to the one-China principle and its tireless efforts to foster peace across the Taiwan Strait. This visit served to reinforce the New Party’s relevance as a consistent interlocutor for Beijing, especially when official channels are closed. The party’s platform often emphasizes shared cultural heritage and the economic benefits of closer integration with the mainland, resonating with a segment of Taiwan’s population that views itself as part of the broader Chinese nation.
The View from the Mainland: Warnings Against Separatism and "De-Sinicization"
The mainland’s concerns were further articulated by Zhang Zhijun, then head of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, who also met with the New Party delegation. Zhang echoed Yu Zhengsheng’s sentiments, emphasizing the critical importance of upholding the one-China principle and expressing resolute opposition to separatist activities. He directly attributed the challenges in cross-Straits relations to the DPP’s refusal to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus, which he stated was the direct cause for the suspension of official communications.
More alarmingly, Zhang pointed to recent actions on the island by what he termed a "Taiwan independence" force, which he claimed was actively "stirring up" Taiwan. He specifically cited proposals to remove Chinese mainland elements from various fields, including education, culture, and social discourse. "Its aim is to cut the historical ties between Taiwan and the mainland, reduce public awareness that Taiwan people are part of the Chinese nation and limit many cultural influences on the island," Zhang asserted. He further warned against efforts to amend laws and even change Taiwan’s constitution, viewing these as clear indicators that "separatist activities and the group supporting ‘independence’ pose the most serious threat to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations." Zhang’s stern warning underscored Beijing’s acute sensitivity to any perceived moves towards formal independence and its determination to counter such efforts, urging people from both sides of the Strait to remain vigilant.
Economic Incentives and Shared Development: A Vision for Integration
Beyond the political rhetoric and warnings, Beijing also presented a vision of shared prosperity and integration. General Secretary Xi Jinping, in his address at the 19th CPC National Congress, outlined a future where Taiwan would share in the vast development opportunities available on the Chinese mainland. He specifically stated that Taiwan residents would enjoy the same treatment as mainland people as they pursue studies, start businesses, seek jobs, or choose to live on the mainland. This policy aims to incentivize closer ties through economic and social integration, offering tangible benefits to Taiwan’s youth and professionals.
Indeed, cross-Straits economic ties have been substantial. Prior to the recent geopolitical shifts, mainland China was Taiwan’s largest trading partner, export destination, and source of trade surplus. In 2017, cross-Straits trade exceeded $180 billion. Hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese businesspeople and their families reside on the mainland, drawn by business opportunities and cultural affinity. Beijing’s offer of "same treatment" for Taiwanese residents is a strategic move designed to deepen this integration, hoping that increased personal and economic interdependence will naturally steer Taiwan away from independence and towards unification. This approach reflects a long-term strategy that combines political pressure with economic inducements, aiming to win hearts and minds through material benefits.
Deepening Exchanges: A Path Forward Amidst Challenges
Despite the political impasse at the official level, both Zhang Zhijun and Yok Mu-ming agreed on the critical need to establish and improve mechanisms for communication and exchange. They vowed to share opinions on major issues affecting the relationship and to actively promote exchanges in all fields, with a particular emphasis on youth. This focus on younger generations is strategic, as both sides recognize the importance of shaping future perspectives on cross-Straits relations. They further agreed to create a constructive and convenient environment for the development of Taiwan youth on the mainland, signaling an intention to facilitate educational, professional, and entrepreneurial opportunities for young Taiwanese individuals.
Such track-two diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges become even more crucial when official channels are frozen. They serve as conduits for information, foster understanding, and maintain a degree of dialogue that can prevent complete estrangement. While these exchanges cannot substitute for formal government-to-government communication, they play a vital role in sustaining a baseline of interaction and potentially mitigating misunderstandings, especially as cross-Straits relations navigate a period of heightened sensitivity.
Implications for Taiwan and Regional Stability
The meeting between Yu Zhengsheng and the New Party delegation carries significant implications. For Beijing, it reaffirms its consistent policy framework and its determination to achieve unification, while simultaneously isolating the DPP government by engaging with pro-unification forces. For the New Party, it boosts its profile as a relevant political actor in cross-Straits discourse, providing it with a platform to articulate its views directly to mainland leadership.
For Taiwan, the implications are more complex. The meeting highlights the deep divisions within its own society regarding its future relationship with mainland China. While the DPP government continues to navigate a delicate balance between asserting Taiwan’s autonomy and avoiding outright confrontation, parties like the New Party actively pursue closer ties. This internal dynamic contributes to a fragmented political landscape, where differing visions for Taiwan’s future compete for public support. The mainland’s explicit warnings against "Taiwan independence" and "de-Sinicization" efforts also underscore the significant risks associated with any perceived moves towards formal separation, which Beijing has repeatedly stated it would not tolerate, even threatening military force if necessary. This creates a perpetual state of tension in the Taiwan Strait, a strategically vital waterway that is considered a potential flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific region. The international community, particularly the United States, which maintains an unofficial relationship with Taiwan under its "One China Policy" (distinct from Beijing’s "One China Principle"), closely monitors these developments, understanding their profound impact on regional stability and global trade.
Looking Ahead: Beijing’s Unwavering Stance
In conclusion, the late 2017 meeting in Beijing served as a robust restatement of mainland China’s position on Taiwan, emphasizing the unshakeable foundation of the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus. It showcased Beijing’s multi-pronged approach: extending economic incentives and opportunities for integration while simultaneously issuing stern warnings against separatist activities and reaffirming its resolve to counter any moves towards formal independence. The engagement with the New Party underscored Beijing’s strategy of fostering ties with sympathetic political forces within Taiwan, especially when official government-to-government dialogue remains suspended. As cross-Straits relations continue to evolve, marked by deep historical ties, economic interdependence, and profound political differences, the principles articulated in this meeting will undoubtedly continue to guide Beijing’s strategy in its enduring quest for national unification and the "great rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation. The future trajectory of the Taiwan Strait remains one of the most critical geopolitical challenges, requiring careful diplomacy and strategic foresight from all involved parties.
Nana Muazin
Muslim
